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威廉·皮特 论拒绝与波拿巴谈判

2006-07-07 17:18

William Pitt

ON HIS REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH BONAPARTE

February 3,1800

  That Bonaparte has an interest in making peace is at best but a doubtful proposition,and that he has an interest in preserving it is still more uncertain.That it is his interest to negotiate,I do not indeed deny.It is his interest,above all,to engage this country in separate negotiation,in order to loosen and dissolve the whole system of the confederacy on the Continent,to palsy at once the arms of Russia,or of Austria,or of any other country that might look to you for support;and then either to break off his separate treaty,or,if he should have concluded it,to apply the lesson which is taught in his school of policy in Egypt,and to revive at his pleasure those claims of indemnification which may have been reserved to some happier period.

  This is precisely the interest which he has in negotiation.But on what grounds are we to be convinced that he has an interest in concluding and observing a solid and permanent pacification?Under all the circumstances of his personal character,and his newly acquired power,what other security has he for retaining that power but the sword?His hold upon France is the sword,and he has no other.Is he connected with the soil,or win megabits,the affections,or the prejudices of the country?He is a stranger,a foreigner,and a usurper.He unites in his own person everything that a pure republican must detest;everything that an enraged Jacobin has abjured;everything that a sincere and faithful royalist must feel as an insult.If he is opposed at any time in his career,what is his appeal?He appeals to his fortune;in other words,to his army and his sword.Placing,thed,his whole reliance upon military support,can he afford to let his military renown pass away,to let his laurels wither,to let the memory of his trophies sink in obscurity?IS it certain that with his army confined within France,and restrained from inroads upon her neighbors,that he can maintain,at his devotion,a force sufficiently numerous to support his power?Having no object but the pos-session of absolute dominion,no passion but military glory,is it to he reckoned as certain that he can feel such an interest in permanent peace as would justify us in laying down our arms,reducing our expense,and relinquishing our means of security,on the faith of his engagements?Do we believe that,after the conclusion of peace,he would not still sigh over the lost trophies of Egypt,wrested from him by the celebrated victory of Aboukir,and the brilliant exertions of that heroic band of British seamen,whose influence and example rendered the Turkish troops invincible at Acre?Can he forget that the effect of these exploits enabled Austria and Prussia,in one campaign,to re-cover from France all which she had acquired by his victories,to dissolve the charm which for a time fascinated Europe,and to show that their generals,contending in a just cause,could efface,even by their success and their military glory,the most dazzling triumphs of his victorious and desolating ambition?

  Can we believe,with these impressions on his mind,that if,after a year,eighteen months,or two years of peace had elapsed,he should be tempted by the appearance of fresh insurrection in Ireland,encouraged by renewed and unrestrained communication with France,and fomented by the fresh infusion of Jacobin principles;if we were at such a moment without a fleet to watch the ports of France,or to guard the coasts of Ireland,with- out a disposable army,or an embodied militia capable of supplying a speedy and adequate reinforcement,and that he had suddenly the means of transporting thither a body of twenty or thirty thousand French troops;can we believe that,at such a moment,his ambition and vindictive spirit would be restrained by the recollection of engagements or the obligation of treaty?Or if,in some new crisis of difficulty and danger to the Ottoman Empire,with no British navy in the Mediterranean,no confederacy formed,no force collected to support it,an opportunity should pre- sent itself for resuming the abandoned expedition to Egypt,for renewing the avowed and favorite project of conquering and colonizing that rich and fertile country,and of opening the way to wound some of the vital interests of England,and to plunder the treasures of the East,in order to fill the bankrupt coffers of France—would it be the interest of Bonaparte,under such circumstances,or his principles,his moderation,his love of peace,his aversion to conquest,and his regard for the independence of other nations—would it be all or any of these that would secure us against an attempt which would leave us only the option of submitting without a struggle to certain loss and disgrace,or of renewing the contest which we had prematurely terminated,without allies,without preparation,with diminished means,and with increased difficulty and hazard?

  What,then,is the inference I draw from all that I have now stated?Is it that we will in no case treat with Bonaparte?I say no such thing.But I say,as has been said in the answer returned to the French note,that we ought to wait for“experience and the evidence of facts” before we are convinced that such a treaty is admissible.The circumstances I have stated would well justify us if we should be slow in being convinced;but on a question of peace and war,everything depends upon degree and up-on comparison.If,on the one hand,there should be an appearance that the policy of France is at length guided by different maxims from those which have hitherto prevailed;if we should here-after see signs of stability in the government which are not now to be traced;if the progress of the al-lied army should not call forth such a spirit in France as to make it probable that the act of the country itself will destroy the system now prevailing;if the danger,the difficulty,the risk of continuing the contest should increase,while the hope of complete ultimate success should be diminished;all these,in their due place,are considerations which,with myself and,I can answer for it,with every one of my colleagues,will have their just weight.But at present these considerations all operate one way;at present there is nothing from which we can presage a favorable disposition to change in the French councils.There is the greatest reason to rely on powerful cooperation from our allies;there are the strongest marks of a disposition in the interior of France to active resistance against this new tyranny;and there is every ground to believe,on reviewing our situation and that of the enemy,that,if we are ultimately disappointed of that complete success which we are at present entitled to hope,the continuance of the contest,instead of making our situation comparatively worse,will have made it comparatively better.

威廉·皮特

论拒绝与波拿巴谈判

1800年2月3日

  波拿巴对媾和的兴趣充其量也不过是一项值得怀疑的建议,至于他对保持和平的兴趣就更不可靠了。我并不否认波拿巴有兴趣谈判。首先,他企图与我国单独谈判,以便削弱乃至瓦解欧洲大陆同盟,并同时使俄国、奥地利或其他可能向你们求助的国家的军队陷于瘫痪;然后或者中止他与别国单独签订协定的谈判;或者,如果他已签定了该协定,他就会运用他在埃及的政策学校里讲授的经验,并且在他乐意时重提那些也许是保留到某个较合适的时期才提出的赔偿要求。

  这就是波拿巴对谈判感兴趣的地方,但我们有什么理由可以相信波拿巴对缔结和遵守永久和平协定感兴趣呢?从其个人性格和新近获得的权力等各方面情况来看,他为保持政权除了用剑外还有其他保证吗?他控制法国靠的是剑而不是其他东西。他威廉·皮特(1759—1806),查塔姆伯爵威廉·皮特之子。英国首相(1783—1801、1804—1806)。这篇演说选自他在下院所作的关于这方面斗争的报告。

  和那个国家的土地、风俗习惯、情感乃至偏见血肉相连吗?他是一个陌路人,一个外国人,一个篡政者。在他身上集中了纯粹的共和党人必定嫉恶的东西;集中了愤怒的雅各宾党人发誓弃绝的东西;集中了每一个诚实而忠诚的保皇党人视为侮辱的东西。如果波拿巴在其事业的任何时刻都遭人反对,那么他求助于什么呢?求助于他手中掌握的财富,换句话说,求助于他的军队和剑。那么,既然完全依靠军队的支持,他经受得住让自己的军事声望烟消云散,名声减色,战功淹没无闻的损失吗?如果他的军队仅限于在法国活动,不能侵袭邻国,他是否能保持一支忠诚于他、在数量上足以支持他的政权的军队?除了攫取绝对统治权外别无目的,除了军事荣誉外再无热情,据此是否可以确实认为:他对永久和平的兴趣足以使我们相信应该放下武器,减少开支,相信其保证的诚意而放弃安全手段?难道我们相信缔造和平之后,他不会因失去埃及战利品而叹息(那是著名的阿布基尔胜利从他手中夺走的),不会因英勇的英国水兵的光辉业绩的影响和榜样使土耳其军队在阿喀拉获胜而叹息吗?难道波拿巴能忘却这些战斗业绩使奥地利和普鲁士在一次战役中从法国收回了她因他的胜利而获得的所有战利品,消除了那曾一度吸引欧洲的魔力,并向世人表明奥、普两国那些为正义事业而斗争的将军们能够以其成功和战斗荣誉抹去他那事事如愿却又令他沮丧的野心所获得的辉煌的胜利吗?

  难道我们能够相信,和平了一年、一年半或两年之后,如果心头压着这些想法的他受到爱尔兰新出现的暴乱的诱惑,受到重新开通的与法国不受拘束的通讯的鼓舞,受到新注入的雅各宾党人原则的挑唆;倘若我们此时没有一支海军去监视法国港口或保卫爱尔兰海岸,没有一支可随时调动的军队或一支已建成的国民军提供迅速、足够的增援,而他却突然获得向各处运送2万至3万法国士兵的手段;难道我们能够相信,此时此刻,他的野心和复仇心态会因想到自己所作的那些保证或他所承担的条约义务而受到约束吗?奥斯曼帝国若遭遇新的困难和危机,在地中海若无英国海军,若不结成同盟,若不集中力量给以支援,他就有了机会重新开始那已放弃的对埃及的远征,重新致力于已公开宣布的征服那个富饶国家,使它成为殖民地,并开辟伤害英国某些利益的途径,以及为补充无力偿债的法国国库而掠夺东方财宝的心爱计划。在此情况下,波拿巴的利益或原则难道会是适当节制、爱好和平、厌恶征战并尊重他国的独立?难道所有这一切或者其中某一件事会保证我们有力量反对这样的企图:它给我们留下的选择仅仅是不加抵抗地忍受损失和丢脸,或者恢复那过早结束的、没有盟国、没有准备、缺乏手段而困难和危险却增多的争夺?

  那么,从上所述我可以得到什么样的结论呢?是否在任何情况下我们都不跟波拿巴谈判?我说不是。但是我认为,正如对法国照会的答复所说的,在相信这种条约是可以考虑的之前,我们应该等着看到“经验和事实证据”。再说我上面所说的这些情况充分证明不要很快相信别人所说的东西;但在战争与和平问题上,一切都取决于程度和对比。一方面,假如出现这样的情况,即法国的政策终于接受现在广为流行的行为准则的引导;假如今后能看到那些现在还看不到的政府稳定的迹象;假如同盟军的进展不能在法国鼓起勇气使得该国的行动本身即足以破坏其现行制度;假如危险、困难和继续争夺的风险增加而彻底成功的希望破灭;那么,所有这些都是我本人应负责作出交代并和我的每个同事加以考虑的,它们都将起到应有的影响。但是,这些考虑都还只是我们这一方面的行动;目前尚无法预言法国议会是否作出有利于变化的处理。我们有充分的理由依靠盟国的强有力的合作;在法国内部存在着积极反对这种新的暴政的极为明显的标志;回顾敌我形势,我们完全有理由相信,如果我们现在对全面胜利所寄予的希望最后竟然落空,继续争夺会使我们的处境变得相对地更好,而并非变得相对地更坏。

  王德华 译

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