外语教育网
您的位置:外语教育网 > 基础英语 > 英语口语 > 名人演讲 正文
  • 站内搜索:

美国国家安全事务助理康多莉扎·赖斯在"9.11委员会"作证

2006-07-07 17:32

  Dr. Rice:

  I thank the Commission for arranging this special session. Thank you for helping to find a way to meet the Nation's need to learn all we can about the September 11th attacks, while preserving important Constitutional principles.

  This Commission, and those who appear before it, have a vital charge. We owe it to those we lost, and to their loved ones, and to our country, to learn all we can about that tragic day, and the events that led to it. Many families of the victims are here today, and I thank them for their contributions to the Commission's work.

  The terrorist threat to our Nation did not emerge on September 11th, 2001. Long before that day, radical, freedom-hating terrorists declared war on America and on the civilized world. The attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985, the rise of al-Qaida and the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the attacks on American installations in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, the East Africa embassy bombings of 1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, these and other atrocities were part of a sustained, systematic campaign to spread devastation and chaos and to murder innocent Americans.

  The terrorists were at war with us, but we were not yet at war with them. For more than 20 years, the terrorist threat gathered, and America's response across several administrations of both parties was insufficient. Historically, democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or until it is too late. Despite the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and continued German harassment of American shipping, the United States did not enter the First World War until two years later. Despite Nazi Germany's repeated violations of the Versailles Treaty and its string of provocations throughout the mid-1930s, the Western democracies did not take action until 1939. The U.S. Government did not act against the growing threat from Imperial Japan until the threat became all too evident at Pearl Harbor. And, tragically, for all the language of war spoken before September 11th, this country simply was not on a war footing.

  Since then, America has been at war. And under President Bush's leadership, we will remain at war until the terrorist threat to our Nation is ended. The world has changed so much that it is hard to remember what our lives were like before that day. But I do want to describe the actions this Administration was taking to fight terrorism before September 11th, 2001.

  After President Bush was elected, we were briefed by the Clinton Administration on many national security issues during the transition. The President-elect and I were briefed by George Tenet on terrorism and on the al-Qaida network. Members of Sandy Berger's NSC staff briefed me, along with other members of the new national security team, on counterterrorism and al-Qaida. This briefing lasted about one hour, and it reviewed the Clinton Administration's counterterrorism approach and the various counterterrorism activities then underway. Sandy and I personally discussed a variety of other topics, including North Korea, Iraq, the Middle East, and the Balkans.

  Because of these briefings and because we had watched the rise of al-Qaida over the years, we understood that the network posed a serious threat to the United States. We wanted to ensure there was no respite in the fight against al-Qaida. On an operational level, we decided immediately to continue pursuing the Clinton Administration's covert action authorities and other efforts to fight the network. President Bush retained George Tenet as Director of Central Intelligence, and Louis Freeh remained the Director of the FBI. I took the unusual step of retaining Dick Clarke and the entire Clinton Administration's counterterrorism team on the NSC staff. I knew Dick to be an expert in his field, as well as an experienced crisis manager. Our goal was to ensure continuity of operations while we developed new and more aggressive policies.

  At the beginning of the Administration, President Bush revived the practice of meeting with the Director of Central Intelligence almost every day in the Oval Office -? meetings which I attended, along with the Vice President and the Chief of Staff. At these meetings, the President received up-to-date intelligence and asked questions of his most senior intelligence officials. From January 20 through September 10, the President received at these daily meetings more than 40 briefing items on al-Qaida, and 13 of these were in response to questions he or his top advisers had posed. In addition to seeing DCI Tenet almost every morning, I generally spoke by telephone every morning at 7:15 with Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld. I also met and spoke regularly with the DCI about al-Qaida and terrorism.

  Of course, we also had other responsibilities. President Bush had set a broad foreign policy agenda. We were determined to confront the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We were improving America's relations with the world's great powers. We had to change an Iraq policy that was making no progress against a hostile regime which regularly shot at U.S. planes enforcing U.N. Security Council Resolutions. And we had to deal with the occasional crisis, for instance, when the crew of a Navy plane was detained in China for 11 days.

  We also moved to develop a new and comprehensive strategy to eliminate the al-Qaida terrorist network. President Bush understood the threat, and he understood its importance. He made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al-Qaida one attack at a time. He told me he was “tired of swatting flies.”

  This new strategy was developed over the Spring and Summer of 2001, and was approved by the President's senior national security officials on September 4. It was the very first major national security policy directive of the Bush Administration -? not Russia, not missile defense, not Iraq, but the elimination of al-Qaida.

  Although this National Security Presidential Directive was originally a highly classified document, we arranged for portions to be declassified to help the Commission in its work, and I will describe some of those today. The strategy set as its goal the elimination of the al-Qaida network. It ordered the leadership of relevant U.S. departments and agencies to make the elimination of al-Qaida a high priority and to use all aspects of our national power -? intelligence, financial, diplomatic, and military ?- to meet this goal. And it gave Cabinet Secretaries and department heads specific responsibilities. For instance:

  * It directed the Secretary of State to work with other countries to end all sanctuaries given to al-Qaida.

  * It directed the Secretaries of the Treasury and State to work with foreign governments to seize or freeze assets and holdings of al-Qaida and its benefactors.

  * It directed the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare an aggressive program of covert activities to disrupt al-Qaida and provide assistance to anti-Taliban groups operating against al-Qaida in Afghanistan.

  * It tasked the Director of OMB with ensuring that sufficient funds were available in the budgets over the next five years to meet the goals laid out in the strategy.

  * And it directed the Secretary of Defense to -? and I quote ?- “ensure that the contingency planning process include plans: against al-Qaida and associated terrorist facilities in Afghanistan, including leadership, command-control-communications, training, and logistics facilities; against Taliban targets in Afghanistan, including leadership, command-control, air and air defense, ground forces, and logistics; to eliminate weapons of mass destruction which al-Qaida and associated terrorist groups may acquire or manufacture, including those stored in underground bunkers.” This was a change from the prior strategy —— Presidential Decision Directive 62, signed in 1998 -? which ordered the Secretary of Defense to provide transportation to bring individual terrorists to the U.S. for trial, to protect DOD forces overseas, and to be prepared to respond to terrorist and weapons of mass destruction incidents.

  More importantly, we recognized that no counterterrorism strategy could succeed in isolation. As you know from the Pakistan and Afghanistan strategy documents that we made available to the Commission, our counterterrorism strategy was part of a broader package of strategies that addressed the complexities of the region.

  Integrating our counterterrorism and regional strategies was the most difficult and the most important aspect of the new strategy to get right. Al-Qaida was both client of and patron to the Taliban, which in turn was supported by Pakistan. Those relationships provided al-Qaida with a powerful umbrella of protection, and we had to sever them. This was not easy.

  Not that we hadn't tried. Within a month of taking office, President Bush sent a strong, private message to President Musharraf urging him to use his influence with the Taliban to bring Bin Laden to justice and to close down al-Qaida training camps. Secretary Powell actively urged the Pakistanis, including Musharraf himself, to abandon support for the Taliban. I met with Pakistan's Foreign Minister in my office in June of 2001. I delivered a very tough message, which was met with a rote, expressionless response.

  America's al-Qaida policy wasn't working because our Afghanistan policy wasn't working. And our Afghanistan policy wasn't working because our Pakistan policy wasn't working. We recognized that America's counterterrorism policy had to be connected to our regional strategies and to our overall foreign policy.

  To address these problems, I made sure to involve key regional experts. I brought in Zalmay Khalilzad, an expert on Afghanistan who, as a senior diplomat in the 1980s, had worked closely with the Afghan Mujahedeen, helping them to turn back the Soviet invasion. I also ensured the participation of the NSC experts on South Asia, as well as the Secretary of State and his regional specialists. Together, we developed a new strategic approach to Afghanistan. Instead of the intense focus on the Northern Alliance, we emphasized the importance of the south -? the social and political heartland of the country. Our new approach to Pakistan combined the use of carrots and sticks to persuade Pakistan to drop its support for the Taliban. And we began to change our approach to India, to preserve stability on the subcontinent.

  While we were developing this new strategy to deal with al-Qaida, we also made decisions on a number of specific anti-al-Qaida initiatives that had been proposed by Dick Clarke. Many of these ideas had been deferred by the last Administration, and some had been on the table since 1998. We increased counterterror assistance to Uzbekistan; we bolstered the Treasury Department's activities to track and seize terrorist assets; we increased funding for counterterrorism activities across several agencies; and we moved quickly to arm Predator unmanned surveillance vehicles for action against al-Qaida.

  When threat reporting increased during the Spring and Summer of 2001, we moved the U.S. Government at all levels to a high state of alert and activity. Let me clear up any confusion about the relationship between the development of our new strategy and the many actions we took to respond to threats that summer. Policy development and crisis management require different approaches. Throughout this period, we did both simultaneously.

  For the essential crisis management task, we depended on the Counterterrorism Security Group chaired by Dick Clarke to be the interagency nerve center. The CSG consisted of senior counterterrorism experts from CIA, the FBI, the Department of Justice, the Defense Department (including the Joint Chiefs), the State Department, and the Secret Service. The CSG had met regularly for many years, and its members had worked through numerous periods of heightened threat activity. As threat information increased, the CSG met more frequently, sometimes daily, to review and analyze the threat reporting and to coordinate actions in response. CSG members also had ready access to their Cabinet Secretaries and could raise any concerns they had at the highest levels.

  The threat reporting that we received in the Spring and Summer of 2001 was not specific as to time, nor place, nor manner of attack. Almost all of the reports focused on al-Qaida activities outside the United States, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. In fact, the information that was specific enough to be actionable referred to terrorist operations overseas. More often, it was frustratingly vague. Let me read you some of the actual chatter that we picked up that Spring and Summer:

  * “Unbelievable news in coming weeks” * “Big event …… there will be a very, very, very, very big uproar” * “There will be attacks in the near future”

  Troubling, yes. But they don't tell us when; they don't tell us where; they don't tell us who; and they don't tell us how.

  In this context, I want to address in some detail one of the briefing items we received, since its content has frequently been mischaracterized. On August 6, 2001, the President's intelligence briefing included a response to questions he had earlier raised about any al-Qaida intentions to strike our homeland. The briefing item reviewed past intelligence reporting, mostly dating from the 1990s, regarding possible al-Qaida plans to attack inside the United States. It referred to uncorroborated reporting from 1998 that terrorists might attempt to hijack a U.S. aircraft in an attempt to blackmail the government into releasing U.S.-held terrorists who had participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This briefing item was not prompted by any specific threat information. And it did not raise the possibility that terrorists might use airplanes as missiles.

  Despite the fact that the vast majority of the threat information we received was focused overseas, I was also concerned about possible threats inside the United States. On July 5, Chief of Staff Andy Card and I met with Dick Clarke, and I asked Dick to make sure that domestic agencies were aware of the heightened threat period and were taking appropriate steps to respond, even though we did not have specific threats to the homeland. Later that same day, Clarke convened a special meeting of his CSG, as well as representatives from the FAA, the INS, Customs, and the Coast Guard. At that meeting, these agencies were asked to take additional measures to increase security and surveillance.

  Throughout this period of heightened threat information, we worked hard on multiple fronts to detect, protect against, and disrupt any terrorist plans or operations that might lead to an attack. For instance:

  * The Department of Defense issued at least five urgent warnings to U.S. military forces that al-Qaida might be planning a near-term attack, and placed our military forces in certain regions on heightened alert.

  * The State Department issued at least four urgent security advisories and public worldwide cautions on terrorist threats, enhanced security measures at certain embassies, and warned the Taliban that they would be held responsible for any al-Qaida attack on U.S. interests.

  * The FBI issued at least three nationwide warnings to Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and specifically stated that, although the vast majority of the information indicated overseas targets, attacks against the homeland could not be ruled out. The FBI also tasked all 56 of its U.S. Field Offices to increase surveillance of known or suspected terrorists and reach out to known informants who might have information on terrorist activities.

  * The FAA issued at least five Civil Aviation Security Information Circulars to all U.S. airlines and airport security personnel, including specific warnings about the possibility of hijackings.

  * The CIA worked round the clock to disrupt threats worldwide. Agency officials launched a wide-ranging disruption effort against al-Qaida in more than 20 countries.

  * During this period, the Vice President, DCI Tenet, and the NSC's Counterterrorism staff called senior foreign officials requesting that they increase their intelligence assistance and report to us any relevant threat information.

  This is a brief sample of our intense activity over the Summer of 2001.

  Yet, as your hearings have shown, there was no silver bullet that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks. In hindsight, if anything might have helped stop 9/11, it would have been better information about threats inside the United States, something made difficult by structural and legal impediments that prevented the collection and sharing of information by our law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

  So the attacks came. A band of vicious terrorists tried to decapitate our government, destroy our financial system, and break the spirit of America. As an officer of government on duty that day, I will never forget the sorrow and the anger I felt. Nor will I forget the courage and resilience shown by the American people and the leadership of the President that day.

  Now, we have an opportunity and an obligation to move forward together. Bold and comprehensive changes are sometimes only possible in the wake of catastrophic events -? events which create a new consensus that allows us to transcend old ways of thinking and acting. Just as World War II led to a fundamental reorganization of our national defense structure and to the creation of the National Security Council, so has September 11th made possible sweeping changes in the ways we protect our homeland.

  President Bush is leading the country during this time of crisis and change. He has unified and streamlined our efforts to secure the American Homeland by creating the Department of Homeland Security, established a new center to integrate and analyze terrorist threat information, directed the transformation of the FBI into an agency dedicated to fighting terror, broken down the bureaucratic walls and legal barriers that prevented the sharing of vital threat information between our domestic law enforcement and our foreign intelligence agencies, and, working with the Congress, given officials new tools, such as the USA PATRIOT Act, to find and stop terrorists. And he has done all of this in a way that is consistent with protecting America's cherished civil liberties and with preserving our character as a free and open society.

  But the President also recognizes that our work is far from complete. More structural reform will likely be necessary. Our intelligence gathering and analysis have improved dramatically in the last two years, but they must be stronger still. The President and all of us in his Administration welcome new ideas and fresh thinking. We are eager to do whatever is necessary to protect the American people. And we look forward to receiving the recommendations of this Commission.

  We are at war and our security as a nation depends on winning that war. We must and we will do everything we can to harden terrorist targets within the United States. Dedicated law enforcement and security professionals continue to risk their lives every day to make us all safer, and we owe them a debt of gratitude. And, let's remember, those charged with protecting us from attack have to succeed 100 percent of the time. To inflict devastation on a massive scale, the terrorists only have to succeed once, and we know they are trying every day.

  That is why we must address the source of the problem. We must stay on offense, to find and defeat the terrorists wherever they live, hide, and plot around the world. If we learned anything on September 11th, 2001, it is that we cannot wait while dangers gather.

  After the September 11th attacks, our Nation faced hard choices. We could fight a narrow war against al-Qaida and the Taliban or we could fight a broad war against a global menace. We could seek a narrow victory or we could work for a lasting peace and a better world. President Bush chose the bolder course.

  He recognizes that the War on Terror is a broad war. Under his leadership, the United States and our allies are disrupting terrorist operations, cutting off their funding, and hunting down terrorists one-by-one. Their world is getting smaller. The terrorists have lost a home-base and training camps in Afghanistan. The Governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia now pursue them with energy and force.

  We are confronting the nexus between terror and weapons of mass destruction. We are working to stop the spread of deadly weapons and prevent then from getting into the hands of terrorists, seizing dangerous materials in transit, where necessary. Because we acted in Iraq, Saddam Hussein will never again use weapons of mass destruction against his people or his neighbors. And we have convinced Libya to give up all its WMD-related programs and materials.

  And as we attack the threat at its sources, we are also addressing its roots. Thanks to the bravery and skill of our men and women in uniform, we removed from power two of the world's most brutal regimes —— sources of violence, and fear, and instability in the region. Today, along with many allies, we are helping the people of Iraq and Afghanistan to build free societies. And we are working with the people of the Middle East to spread the blessings of liberty and democracy as the alternatives to instability, hatred, and terror. This work is hard and dangerous, yet it is worthy of our effort and our sacrifice. The defeat of terror and the success of freedom in those nations will serve the interests of our Nation and inspire hope and encourage reform throughout the greater Middle East.

  In the aftermath of September 11th, those were the right choices for America to make —— the only choices that can ensure the safety of our Nation in the decades to come.

  Thank you. Now I am happy to answer your questions.

  赖斯:

  我感谢调查委员会安排这次特别会议。感谢你们在维护重要的宪法原则的同时,努力帮助找到一种方式,满足我们国家要尽可能了解有关9.11袭击事件情况的需要。

  贵委员会以及到委员会作证的人,都有一项重要使命。为了遇难者和他们的亲人,为了我们的国家,我们必须了解有关那个悲惨的日子和导致它的种种事件的所有情况。今天有很多遇难者家属在座,我感谢他们为委员会的工作做出的贡献。

  对我国的恐怖主义威胁并非在2001年9月11日才出现。早在这之前,仇恨自由的极端恐怖主义分子就已对美国和文明世界宣战。1983年驻黎巴嫩的海军陆战队营房被炸,1985年“阿奇里·劳罗”(Achille Lauro)号游轮被劫持,“基地”组织的兴起和1993年的世贸中心爆炸案,1995年和1996年对美国在沙特阿拉伯的军事设施的袭击,1998年美国驻东非地区的大使馆被炸,以及2000年对美国“科尔”号军舰(USS Cole)的攻击,所有这些以及其他种种暴行,都是四处制造破坏和混乱及谋害无辜美国人的持续和蓄意行动的一部份。

  恐怖主义分子已经对我们开战,但我们当时还没有对他们宣战。在20多年中,恐怖主义威胁日益严重,但美国两党数届政府都没有做出充份的反应。纵观历史,民主社会面对日益严重的威胁一向反应迟缓,往往等到危险发展到不容忽视的程度或者已经为时太晚才采取措施。尽管“卢西塔尼亚”号(Lusitania)游轮于 1915年被击沉,而且德国不断骚扰美国航运,但美国直到两年以后才参加第一次世界大战。尽管纳粹德国屡次违反凡尔赛和约(Versailles Treaty)并在1930年代中期做出了一系列挑衅行径,但西方民主国家直到1939年才采取行动。美国政府一直没有对日本帝国所构成的日益严重的威胁做出反应,直到这种威胁赤裸裸地降临珍珠港。而且,令人痛心的是,尽管“9.11”之前有种种战争言论,但这个国家根本没有立足战争。

  但从那以后,美国一直处于战争状态。在布什总统的领导下,我们将持续作战,直到消除我国受到的恐怖主义威胁。世界的变化如此巨大,以致我们很难回想起在那个日子以前的生活情景。但我确实想介绍一下本届政府在2001年9月11日以前为抗击恐怖主义所采取的行动。

  在布什总统当选后,克林顿政府在交接阶段向我们通报了很多国家安全方面的事宜。乔治·特尼特(George Tenet)向候任总统和我介绍了有关恐怖主义和“基地”组织网的情况。桑迪·伯杰(Sandy Berger)领导的国家安全委员会成员向我和新的国家安全事务班子的其他成员通报了有关反恐怖主义和“基地”组织的情况。这次通报会持续了一个小时左右,会议回顾了克林顿政府的反恐怖主义政策和当时正在进行的各种反恐怖主义活动。桑迪和我面对面地讨论了多项其他议题,包括北韩、伊拉克、中东和巴尔干。

  由于听取了这些汇报,也由于我们多年来一直关注 “基地”组织的发展,我们明白这个网络对美国构成严重威胁。我们要确保继续打击“基地”组织,不给它任何喘息的机会。在行动方面,我们即刻决定延续克林顿政府对秘密行动的授权并继续进行其他打击该网络的努力。布什总统让乔治·特尼特继续担任中央情报局(CIA)局长,联邦调查局(FBI)局长路易斯·弗里 (Louis Freeh)也继续留任。我也特例留用了迪克·克拉克(Dick Clarke)和克林顿政府反恐怖主义班子的全体成员,让他们继续在国家安全委员会任职。我知道迪克是这方面的专家,而且在处理危机方面经验丰富。我们的宗旨是在制定新的、更积极的政策的同时,确保有关行动继续进行。

  本届政府就任伊始,布什总统恢复了几乎每天都在椭圆形办公室听取中央情报局局长汇报的惯例──我本人、副总统和白宫办公室主任都参加了这些会议。在这些会议上,总统得到最新的情报,向政府最高情报官员提出问题。从1月20日到9月10日,总统在这些例会上听取了40多项有关“基地”组织的汇报,其中13项是对他或他的高级顾问提问的回答。除了几乎每天上午都同中央情报局局长特尼特会晤以外,我几乎每天早上7时15分都同国务卿鲍威尔和国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德通电话。我还就“基地”组织和恐怖主义问题定期同中央情报局局长会晤和通话。

  当然,我们还有其他职责。布什总统制定了内容广泛的对外政策议程。我们决心制止大规模毁灭性武器的扩散。我们当时正在改善美国同其他世界大国的关系。我们不得不改变对伊拉克的政策,因为这个政策对遏制这个敌对政权──它频频向执行联合国安理会决议的美国飞机开火──丝毫没有见效。我们还必须处理偶发性危机,例如海军飞机机组人员被中国扣留11天的事件。

  我们也采取行动,为取缔“基地”恐怖主义组织网制订新的全面战略。布什总统了解这一威胁,了解这一威胁的严重性。他向我们明确表示,他不愿逐一逐次地回应“基地”组织的袭击。他对我说,他“厌倦了打苍蝇”。

  这项新战略是在2001年春夏时期制订的,于9月4日得到总统国家安全高级官员的通过。它是布什政府制订的第一项重大安全政策指示──针对的不是俄罗斯、不是导弹防御、不是伊拉克,而是铲除“基地”组织。

  虽然这项《国家安全总统令》(National Security Presidential Directive)原本是一份高度机密文件,但我们设法将其中一部份解密,以便于9.11调查委员会的工作。我今天将对部份文件进行说明。这项战略将铲除“基地”组织网定为目标。它命令美国各相关部、局把铲除“基地”组织作为一项重要任务,并动用我国各方面国力──情报、金融、外交和军事──来实现这一目标。它给内阁级部长和其他各不部长规定了具体职责。例如:

  。它指示国务卿同其他国家一道努力,终止对“基地”组织的一切庇护。

  。它指示财政部长和国务卿与外国政府一道努力,截获或冻结“基地”组织及其赞助者的资产和不动产。

  。它指示中央情报局局长制订一套积极的秘密行动计划,干扰“基地”组织并为在阿富汗的反塔利班组织的行动提供援助。

  。它责成白宫行政管理和预算局(OMB)主任确保在今后5年内,有充足的经费实现战略方案提出的目标。

  。它指示国防部长──我引述原文──“确保应急计划包含以下方案:打击'基地'组织及其在阿富汗的相关恐怖分子设施,包括领导层、指挥控制通讯、培训和后勤设施;打击阿富汗境内的塔利班目标,包括领导层、指挥控制、空军防空、地面部队及后勤;消除'基地'组织和有关的恐怖主义组织可能获得或生产的大规模毁灭性武器,包括储藏在地下工事中的武器。” 这是对此前战略的改变──1998年签署的《第62号总统决策令》(Presidential Decision Directive 62)指示国防部长提供交通工具,将恐怖主义分子送交美国接受审判;保护国防部驻外部队;为反击恐怖主义分子和大规模毁灭性武器事件做好准备。

  更重要的是,我们认识到,没有任何反恐怖主义战略能够单独取胜。如你们从我们向贵委员会提供的有关巴基斯坦和阿富汗战略文件中所了解的,我们的反恐怖主义战略是针对这个地区的复杂情况所制定的一整套更广泛的战略的一部份。

  将我们的反恐怖主义战略与区域性战略相结合,是新战略应实现的最艰难和最重要的方面。 “基地”组织既是塔利班庇护的对象,又是塔利班的资助保护者,塔利班同时也得到巴基斯坦的支持。这些关系为“基地”组织提供了一个巨大的保护伞,我们当时必须切断这些关系。而这并非易事。

  我们并非没有做出努力。布什总统就职后的一个月内,就给穆沙拉夫(Musharraf)总统私下送去一个强有力的信息,敦促穆沙拉夫利用他与塔利班的影响将本拉登(Bin Laden)绳之以法,并取缔“基地”组织的训练营地。鲍威尔国务卿积极敦促巴基斯坦人,包括穆沙拉夫本人在内,放弃对塔利班的支持。2001年6月,我在我的办公室会晤了巴基斯坦外长。我传递了非常强硬的信息,但对方做出的是公事性的、毫无表情的反应。

  美国针对“基地”组织的政策没有奏效,因为我们针对阿富汗的政策没有奏效。我们的阿富汗政策没有奏效是因为我们的巴基斯坦政策没有奏效。我们认识到,美国的反恐怖主义政策必须与我们的区域性战略、乃至我们的整个外交政策相结合。

  为了解决这些问题,我努力做到让关键的区域问题专家参与进来。我邀请了阿富汗问题专家扎勒梅·哈利勒扎德(Zalmay Khalilzad),他在80年代担任高级外交官时,曾与阿富汗圣战者组织(Mujahedeen)有过密切合作,帮助他们击败前苏联的入侵。我还确保国家安全委员会的南亚问题专家、以及国务卿和他的区域问题专家参与这些事务。我们共同制定了解决阿富汗问题的新战略。我们没有将重点大力集中于北方联盟,而是强调南方的重要性──南方是阿富汗的社会和政治中心。我们以新的胡萝卜与大棒并举的方式对待巴基斯坦问题,促使它停止支持塔利班。我们也开始改变我们对待印度的方法,以维护印度次大陆的稳定。

  在我们制定对付“基地”组织的新战略的同时,我们也就由迪克·克拉克提出的一系列反“基地”组织的具体行动计划做出决策。上届政府推迟了对其中许多建议的决定,有些建议在1998年就被提上桌面。我们向乌兹别克斯坦增加了反恐怖主义援助;我们支持财政部追踪和扣押恐怖主义资产的行动;我们增加了对几个政府机构之间的反恐怖主义活动的拨款;我们迅速采取行动,为打击“基地”组织而装备“捕获者”(Predator)无人驾驶侦察机。

  当2001年春夏之际有关威胁的报告增多时,我们使各级美国政府进入高度警戒状态和采取相关行动。让我来对我们制定新战略与我们那年夏天为应对威胁所采取的许多行动之间的关系作一澄清。制定政策与处理危机需要不同的举措。在那一阶段,我们同时进行了双方面的工作。

  对危机处理的基本工作,我们依靠由迪克·克拉克领导的反恐怖主义安全小组(Counterterrorism Security Group)作为各部门间的神经中枢。该小组由来自中央情报局、联邦调查局、司法部、国防部(包括参谋长联席会议)、国务院以及特工处等部门的反恐怖主义资深专家组成。多年来,反恐怖主义安全小组定期开会,其成员具有在多次高度威胁警戒期工作的经验。随着有关威胁信息的增多,安全小组开会的频率增加,有时每天开会,以评估和分析有关威胁的情报,并协调应对行动。安全小组成员还可随时与内阁部长联系,可把他们的关注提至最高层。

  我们在2001年春夏之际收到的有关威胁的报告无论在时间、地点、还是袭击方式等方面均不详细具体。几乎所有报告都集中在“基地”组织在美国以外──尤其是在中东和北非地区──的活动。事实上,具体到可以采取应对措施的情报仅涉及海外的恐怖主义活动。通常,这类报告都是令人无奈地含糊。让我给诸位读一些我们在那年春夏之际收集的某些话语:

  ·“数周内会出现难以置信的消息”

  ·“大事……会出非常、非常、非常、非常大的骚乱”

  ·“不久的将来将有袭击”

  这确实令人不安。但它们没有告诉我们何时,没有告诉我们何地,没有告诉我们何人,没有告诉我们何种方式。

  以这种情况为背景,我想比较详细地谈谈我们收到的一则通报,因为它的内容经常被曲解。2001年8月6日,在总统的情报通报会上,有一项对总统早些时候提出的问题做出的回答,那个问题是关于基地“组织攻击我国国土的意图。这项通报回顾了过去的情报报告,大部份始于90年代,内容是围绕”基地“组织在美国国内发动攻击的可能计划。通报提及一份未经核实的1998年的报告;那份报告说,恐怖主义分子可能企图劫持一架美国飞机,用以要挟美国政府释放因参与1993 年世界贸易中心爆炸事件而被美方拘押的恐怖主义分子。那份报告不是基于任何具体威胁的情报而提出的,也没有提到恐怖主义分子把飞机作为导弹使用的可能性。

  尽管我们收到的大部份有关威胁的情报都针对海外,但我仍对美国国内有可能受到威胁感到担心。7月5日白宫办公厅主任安迪·内阁卡德(Andy Card)和我与迪克·克拉克会晤, 我请迪克要确保国内的机构意识到这段时期威胁已经升级,并采取恰当的反应措施,尽管当时我们没有掌握具体针对国内的威胁。同一天的晚些时候, 克拉克召开了他的反恐安全小组的特别会议,参加会议的还有来自联邦航空管理局(FAA)、移民局(INS)、海关(Customs)和海岸警卫队(Coast Guard)的代表。会上这些机构被要求采取进一步措施来加强安全和监督。

  在关于威胁的情报升级的整个阶段,我们从几条战线上做出努力,以便发现、预防和瓦解任何可能导致攻击事件的恐怖主义计划或行动。例如:

  ·国防部至少向美国部队发出5份紧急警告,告之“基地”组织可能正在策划一场近期攻击,并使某些地区的驻军进入升级警戒状态。

  ·国务院至少发布了4次针对恐怖主义威胁的紧急安全公告和全球安全预警,加强了对某些驻外大使馆的安全措施,并且警告塔利班政权,他们要对“基地”组织针对美国利益的任何攻击行动负责。

  · 联邦调查局向联邦、州和地方执法机构发出至少3次全国性的警告,具体指出,虽然情报大部份针对海外目标,但不可排除对美国本土的攻击。联邦调查局还责成它在国内的所有56个地方办事处,加强对已知和可疑的恐怖主义分子的监督,并与我们认识的可能握有恐怖主义活动情报的内线人取得联系。

  ·美国联邦航空管理局向各美国航空公司和机场安全人员发出至少5份民航安全情况通知,包括关于劫持飞机可能性的具体警告。

  ·中央情报局以夜以继日的努力,解除在世界范围内出现的威胁。中央情报局官员在20多个国家开展了范围广泛的瓦解“基地”组织威胁的活动。

  ·在这段时期,副总统、中央情报局局长特尼特、国家安全委员会反恐班子的成员分别打电话给外国高级官员,请他们增加情报援助,并随时向我们通报任何威胁信息。

  这是对我们在2001年夏天做出的大量努力的简单举例说明。

  但是,如同你们的听证会显示的那样,没有任何可以防止9.11袭击发生的法宝。从事后来看,如果当时有任何因素可能帮助制止9.11事件的话,那应该是有更好的关于美国境内威胁的情报。但结构和法律障碍阻止我们的执法部门和情报机构收集和交换情报,从而给这方面带来困难。

  因此,袭击发生了。一夥凶残的恐怖主义分子试图斩首我们的政府,摧毁我们的金融体系,挫败美国精神。作为一名那天在职的政府官员,我永远不会忘记我当时的悲哀和愤怒。我也不会忘记美国人民当天所显示出的勇气和振作力以及总统的领导才能。

  现在,我们有机会和责任共同向前迈进。大胆和全面的改变有时只有在灾难事件后才能出现──这些灾难事件带来新的共识,促使我们超越旧式思维和行动方式。正如第二次世界大战导致我国国防结构的根本改组和国家安全委员会的诞生,9.11袭击事件使我们能够对保护国土的方式做出全面改革。

  布什总统是这个危机和变化时期的国家领导人。他整合了保护美国国土安全的工作,具体措施包括组建国土安全部(Department of Homeland Security),新建一个综合分析有关恐怖主义威胁的情报中心,指示联邦调查局转型成为从事反恐斗争的机构,消除阻碍我国国内执法机构与对外情报机构相互交换有关威胁的重要情报的体制隔阂和法律障碍,并与国会合作,给予有关官员诸如《美国爱国法》(USA Patriot Act)等新手段来查明和制止恐怖主义分子。他在进行所有这些努力的同时,维护了美国备受珍视的公民自由以及我国作为一个自由、开放的社会的特色。

  但总统也认识到我们的工作还远远没有完成。可能有必要进行更多的结构改革。我们的情报收集和分析工作两年来取得了长足的进步,但还有待进一步加强。总统和我们所有在他的政府中的官员都欢迎新观点和新思维。我们迫切希望为保护美国人民做出一切必要努力。我们也期待听到贵委员会提出的建议。

  我们处于战争状态,我们的国家安全取决于赢得这场战争。我们必须而且将会全力以赴地确定美国国内的恐怖主义打击对象。具有献身精神的执法人员和治安人员继续日复一日地冒着生命危险保障我们所有人的安全,我们应对他们深表感谢。此外还应记住,那些负责保护我们不遭攻击的人,必须万无一失。恐怖主义分子只需一次得逞,就会造成重大灾难,而我们知道他们每天都在力图这样做。

  因此,我们必须找到问题的根源。我们必须保持攻势,不管恐怖主义分子在世界上哪一角落落脚、藏身和策划,我们都要找到并击溃他们。如果我们从2001年9月11日吸取了任何教训的话,那就是,绝不能任凭危险加剧。

  在9.11袭击事件发生后,我国面临一个艰难的抉择。我们可以针对“基地”组织和塔利班进行一次小规模作战,也可以针对全球性威胁进行一场大规模作战。我们可以争取小范围的胜利,也可以为建设长期和平和一个更加美好的世界而努力。布什总统选择了更有胆魄的目标。

  总统认识到反恐怖之战是一场大规模战争。在他的领导下,美国及盟国正在制止恐怖主义活动、切断恐怖主义的资金来源并将恐怖主义分子一个个捉拿归案。他们的地盘日益缩小。恐怖主义分子丧失了在阿富汗的大本营和训练营地。现在,巴基斯坦和沙特阿拉伯政府正在大力追剿他们。

  我们正面临着同恶相济的恐怖和大规模毁灭性武器。我们正在努力制止致命武器的扩散并防止它们落入恐怖主义分子手中,并且在必要时截获转运中的危险物资。由于我们对伊拉克采取了行动,萨达姆·侯赛因再也不能对他本国人民或他的邻国使用大规模毁灭性武器了。此外,我们还说服了利比亚放弃其所有同大规模毁灭性武器有关的项目和材料。

  我们在打击威胁的源头之时,也在努力铲除其产生的根源。凭借我国男女军人的英勇和技能,我们推翻了世界上两个最残暴的政权──该地区暴力、恐惧和动荡的根源。今天,我们正在同多方盟友一道,帮助伊拉克和阿富汗人民建设自由的社会。我们还在同中东人民合作,传播自由和民主的福祉,取代动乱荡、仇恨和恐怖。这项工作是艰巨和危险的,但它值得我们为之付出努力和牺牲。在这些国家击败恐怖、赢得自由不仅符合我国的利益,而且将在整个大中东地区唤起希望和激励改革。

  这是美国在9 .11之后应当做出的正确选择──这是在未来岁月中能够确保我国安全的唯一选择。

  谢谢。现在我愿意回答你们的提问。

相关热词:名人 演讲
栏目相关课程表
科目名称 主讲老师 课时 免费试听 优惠价 购买课程
英语零起点 郭俊霞 30课时 试听 150元/门 购买
综艺乐园 ------ 13课时 试听 100元/门 购买
边玩边学 ------ 10课时 试听 60元/门 购买
情景喜剧 ------ 15课时 试听 100元/门 购买
欢乐课堂 ------ 35课时 试听 150元/门 购买
基础英语辅导课程
郭俊霞 北京语言大学毕业,专业英语八级,国内某知名中学英语教研组组长,教学标兵……详情>>
郭俊霞:零基础英语网上辅导名师

  1、凡本网注明 “来源:外语教育网”的所有作品,版权均属外语教育网所有,未经本网授权不得转载、链接、转贴或以其他方式使用;已经本网授权的,应在授权范围内使用,且必须注明“来源:外语教育网”。违反上述声明者,本网将追究其法律责任。
  2、本网部分资料为网上搜集转载,均尽力标明作者和出处。对于本网刊载作品涉及版权等问题的,请作者与本网站联系,本网站核实确认后会尽快予以处理。本网转载之作品,并不意味着认同该作品的观点或真实性。如其他媒体、网站或个人转载使用,请与著作权人联系,并自负法律责任。
  3、联系方式
  编辑信箱:for68@chinaacc.com
  电话:010-82319999-2371